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Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents

Francisco Espinosa, Debraj Ray

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2023 · 15 (2) · 493-535

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200472 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2023. Verfasst von Francisco Espinosa und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 60 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: “if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.” We consider extensions and applications, including non-normal signal structures, dynamics with term limits, risky portfolio management, and political risk-taking. (JEL D72, D82, G11, G41)

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APA

Espinosa, F., & Ray, D. (2023). Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 493-535. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200472

Vancouver

Espinosa F, Ray D. Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2023;15(2):493-535. doi:10.1257/mic.20200472

BibTeX
@article{Espinosa2023,
  author = {Espinosa, Francisco and Ray, Debraj},
  title = {Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {15},
  number = {2},
  pages = {493--535},
  doi = {10.1257/mic.20200472}
}
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