Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2023 · 15 (2) · 493-535
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200472 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2023. Verfasst von Francisco Espinosa und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 60 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: “if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.” We consider extensions and applications, including non-normal signal structures, dynamics with term limits, risky portfolio management, and political risk-taking. (JEL D72, D82, G11, G41)
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APA
Espinosa, F., & Ray, D. (2023). Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 493-535. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200472
Vancouver
Espinosa F, Ray D. Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2023;15(2):493-535. doi:10.1257/mic.20200472
BibTeX
@article{Espinosa2023,
author = {Espinosa, Francisco and Ray, Debraj},
title = {Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2023},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {493--535},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20200472}
}
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