Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.08.2024 · 16 (3) · 1-42
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200407 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.08.2024. Verfasst von Alex Rees-Jones und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We present results from three experiments containing incentivized school choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students’ application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive “safety” options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms. (JEL C78, C91, D82, I23)
Zitieren
APA
Rees-Jones, A., Shorrer, R., & Tergiman, C. (2024). Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 16(3), 1-42. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200407
Vancouver
Rees-Jones A, Shorrer R, Tergiman C. Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2024;16(3):1-42. doi:10.1257/mic.20200407
BibTeX
@article{ReesJones2024,
author = {Rees-Jones, Alex and Shorrer, Ran and Tergiman, Chloe},
title = {Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2024},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {1--42},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20200407}
}
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