Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.11.2022 · 14 (4) · 218-256
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200200 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.11.2022. Verfasst von Daron Acemoglu und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 122-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and privacy. These depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing. We characterize conditions under which shutting down data markets improves welfare. Platform competition does not redress the problem of excessively low data prices and too much data sharing and may further reduce welfare. We propose a scheme based on mediated data sharing that improves efficiency. (JEL D62, D83, H23, L51, L86, L88)
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APA
Acemoglu, D., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A., & Ozdaglar, A. (2022). Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14(4), 218-256. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200200
Vancouver
Acemoglu D, Makhdoumi A, Malekian A, Ozdaglar A. Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2022;14(4):218-256. doi:10.1257/mic.20200200
BibTeX
@article{Acemoglu2022,
author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Makhdoumi, Ali and Malekian, Azarakhsh and Ozdaglar, Asu},
title = {Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2022},
volume = {14},
number = {4},
pages = {218--256},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20200200}
}
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