Information Design
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.11.2019 · 11 (4) · 151-185
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170351 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.11.2019. Verfasst von Ina Taneva. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 56-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 13 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal. (JEL C72, D78, D82, D83)
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APA
Taneva, I. (2019). Information Design. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(4), 151-185. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170351
Vancouver
Taneva I. Information Design. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019;11(4):151-185. doi:10.1257/mic.20170351
BibTeX
@article{Taneva2019,
author = {Taneva, Ina},
title = {Information Design},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2019},
volume = {11},
number = {4},
pages = {151--185},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20170351}
}
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