An Analytical Model of Behavior and Policy in an Epidemic
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 01.07.2026 · 18 (3) · 136-173
DOI: 10.1257/mac.20230299 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, erschienen am 01.07.2026. Verfasst von Lukasz Rachel. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines the behavior of individuals susceptible to a deadly disease in a tractable equilibrium setting. We analytically characterize individually optimal mitigation behavior and the resulting equilibrium trajectory. Analysis is facilitated by a phase diagram. A key insight is that individually optimal behavior of those susceptible to the disease results in excessive caution. This behavior flattens the epidemic curve and prolongs the epidemic. In contrast, socially optimal behavior results in a higher infection rate, with a focus on minimizing cumulative deaths at minimum cost. The paper offers novel technical contributions and an improved understanding of externalities in econ-epi models. (JEL D62, D91, I12, I18)
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APA
Rachel, L. (2026). An Analytical Model of Behavior and Policy in an Epidemic. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 18(3), 136-173. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20230299
Vancouver
Rachel L. An Analytical Model of Behavior and Policy in an Epidemic. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2026;18(3):136-173. doi:10.1257/mac.20230299
BibTeX
@article{Rachel2026,
author = {Rachel, Lukasz},
title = {An Analytical Model of Behavior and Policy in an Epidemic},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {136--173},
doi = {10.1257/mac.20230299}
}
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