Information Frictions and Employee Sorting between Start-ups
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 01.04.2026 · 18 (2) · 369-406
DOI: 10.1257/app.20240722 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, erschienen am 01.04.2026. Verfasst von Kevin A. Bryan und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 67 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Would workers apply to better firms if they were more informed about firm quality? Collaborating with 26 science-based start-ups, we create a custom job board and invite business school alumni to apply. The job board randomizes across applicants to show coarse expert ratings of all start-ups' science and/or business model quality. Making ratings visible strongly reallocates applications toward higher-rated firms. This reallocation holds, restricting to high-quality workers. Treatments operate in part by shifting worker beliefs about firms' right-tail outcomes. Despite these benefits, workers make posttreatment bets indicating highly overoptimistic beliefs about start-up success, suggesting a problem of broader informational deficits. (JEL D22, D83, J22, J23, J24, M13, M51)
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APA
Bryan, K. A., Hoffman, M., & Sariri, A. (2026). Information Frictions and Employee Sorting between Start-ups. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 18(2), 369-406. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240722
Vancouver
Bryan KA, Hoffman M, Sariri A. Information Frictions and Employee Sorting between Start-ups. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2026;18(2):369-406. doi:10.1257/app.20240722
BibTeX
@article{Bryan2026,
author = {Bryan, Kevin A. and Hoffman, Mitchell and Sariri, Amir},
title = {Information Frictions and Employee Sorting between Start-ups},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {369--406},
doi = {10.1257/app.20240722}
}
EUVIMED