Turbocharging Profits? Contract Gaming and Revenue Allocation in Healthcare
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 01.07.2026 · 18 (3) · 322-361
DOI: 10.1257/app.20240589 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, erschienen am 01.07.2026. Verfasst von Atul Gupta und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 117 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Firms often exploit weaknesses in government contracts to boost revenues, yet little is known about how they allocate these funds. We study how hospitals allocated $3 billion obtained from gaming a Medicare loophole. The average gaming hospital increased Medicare and total revenue by around 10 percent, implying large spillovers on other payers. Nonprofit hospitals deployed most funds toward operating costs. For-profits—driven by a large chain—deducted funds off their balance sheets, distributing them to executives and shareholders. Accordingly, we detect reductions in mortality only at nonprofits. Our results imply that the consequences of engineered windfalls vary substantially by hospital ownership. (JEL D86, H51, I11, I12, I18, L31)
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APA
Gupta, A., Forgia, A. L., & Sacarny, A. (2026). Turbocharging Profits? Contract Gaming and Revenue Allocation in Healthcare. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 18(3), 322-361. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20240589
Vancouver
Gupta A, Forgia AL, Sacarny A. Turbocharging Profits? Contract Gaming and Revenue Allocation in Healthcare. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2026;18(3):322-361. doi:10.1257/app.20240589
BibTeX
@article{Gupta2026,
author = {Gupta, Atul and Forgia, Ambar La and Sacarny, Adam},
title = {Turbocharging Profits? Contract Gaming and Revenue Allocation in Healthcare},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {322--361},
doi = {10.1257/app.20240589}
}
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