Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 01.07.2024 · 16 (3) · 323-353
DOI: 10.1257/app.20220088 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, erschienen am 01.07.2024. Verfasst von Abhijit Banerjee und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 40 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors’ high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. (JEL D72, D83, H75, J16, O15, O17, O18)
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APA
Banerjee, A., Enevoldsen, N., Pande, R., & Walton, M. (2024). Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 16(3), 323-353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088
Vancouver
Banerjee A, Enevoldsen N, Pande R, Walton M. Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2024;16(3):323-353. doi:10.1257/app.20220088
BibTeX
@article{Banerjee2024,
author = {Banerjee, Abhijit and Enevoldsen, Nils and Pande, Rohini and Walton, Michael},
title = {Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {323--353},
doi = {10.1257/app.20220088}
}
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