Improving Regulatory Effectiveness through Better Targeting: Evidence from OSHA
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 01.10.2023 · 15 (4) · 30-67
DOI: 10.1257/app.20200659 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, erschienen am 01.10.2023. Verfasst von Matthew S. Johnson und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 70 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study how a regulator can best target inspections. Our case study is a US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) program that randomly allocated some inspections. On average, each inspection led to 2.4 (9 percent) fewer serious injuries over the next 5 years. Using new machine learning methods, we find that OSHA could have averted as much as twice as many injuries by targeting inspections to workplaces with the highest expected averted injuries and nearly as many by targeting the highest expected level of injuries. Either approach would have generated up to $850 million in social value over the decade we examine. (JEL C63, J28, J81, K32, L51)
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APA
Johnson, M. S., Levine, D. I., & Toffel, M. W. (2023). Improving Regulatory Effectiveness through Better Targeting: Evidence from OSHA. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 15(4), 30-67. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200659
Vancouver
Johnson MS, Levine DI, Toffel MW. Improving Regulatory Effectiveness through Better Targeting: Evidence from OSHA. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2023;15(4):30-67. doi:10.1257/app.20200659
BibTeX
@article{Johnson2023,
author = {Johnson, Matthew S. and Levine, David I. and Toffel, Michael W.},
title = {Improving Regulatory Effectiveness through Better Targeting: Evidence from OSHA},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {15},
number = {4},
pages = {30--67},
doi = {10.1257/app.20200659}
}
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