Breaking Bad News
American Economic Review: Insights · 01.06.2026 · 8 (2) · 233-246
DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20250043 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review: Insights, erschienen am 01.06.2026. Verfasst von Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study how information disclosure shapes social learning about a potentially harmful product. Increased transparency helps early agents avoid harm, which may undermine learning by later agents. Despite this conflict of interest, we show that full transparency is uniquely optimal for all agents when they learn only by observing neighbors’ harm. We investigate whether full transparency about harm continues to benefit all agents when they also learn from additional, imperfect signals. (JEL D18, D82, D83, L15)
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APA
Meyer-ter-Vehn, M., & Board, S. (2026). Breaking Bad News. American Economic Review: Insights, 8(2), 233-246. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20250043
Vancouver
Meyer-ter-Vehn M, Board S. Breaking Bad News. American Economic Review: Insights. 2026;8(2):233-246. doi:10.1257/aeri.20250043
BibTeX
@article{MeyerterVehn2026,
author = {Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz and Board, Simon},
title = {Breaking Bad News},
journal = {American Economic Review: Insights},
year = {2026},
volume = {8},
number = {2},
pages = {233--246},
doi = {10.1257/aeri.20250043}
}
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