A Theory of Price Caps on Nonrenewable Resources
American Economic Review · 01.07.2026 · 116 (7) · 2711-2753
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20250064 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.07.2026. Verfasst von Simon Johnson und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 90 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What is the optimal response of a resource exporter when a price cap is imposed on its main export? This paper develops a dynamic framework incorporating stochastic prices, financial frictions, and market power to study this novel tool of statecraft. With the right design, a price cap can incentivize increased extraction, stabilizing prices in the global market. But the stabilizing effects diminish when there is leakage outside the cap. Consequently, weak enforcement of the policy worsens the trade-off faced by the sanctioning policymaker. We provide a systematic approach to setting and enforcing an optimal cap level in these circumstances. (JEL F12, F14, F51, L71, P28, P33, Q35)
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APA
Johnson, S., Rachel, L., & Wolfram, C. (2026). A Theory of Price Caps on Nonrenewable Resources. American Economic Review, 116(7), 2711-2753. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20250064
Vancouver
Johnson S, Rachel L, Wolfram C. A Theory of Price Caps on Nonrenewable Resources. American Economic Review. 2026;116(7):2711-2753. doi:10.1257/aer.20250064
BibTeX
@article{Johnson2026,
author = {Johnson, Simon and Rachel, Lukasz and Wolfram, Catherine},
title = {A Theory of Price Caps on Nonrenewable Resources},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
number = {7},
pages = {2711--2753},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20250064}
}
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