Monetary Policy without Commitment
American Economic Review · 01.07.2026 · 116 (7) · 2422-2453
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20241925 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.07.2026. Verfasst von Hassan Afrouzi und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies the implications of central bank credibility for long-run inflation and inflation dynamics. We introduce central bank lack of commitment into a standard nonlinear New Keynesian economy with sticky-price monopolistically competitive firms. Inflation is driven by the interaction of lack of commitment and the economic environment. We show that long-run inflation increases following an unanticipated permanent increase in the labor wedge or decrease in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In the transition, inflation overshoots and then gradually declines. Quantitatively, inflation overshooting is persistent, and the welfare loss from lack of commitment relative to inflation targeting is large. (JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58)
Zitieren
APA
Afrouzi, H., Halac, M., Rogoff, K., & Yared, P. (2026). Monetary Policy without Commitment. American Economic Review, 116(7), 2422-2453. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20241925
Vancouver
Afrouzi H, Halac M, Rogoff K, Yared P. Monetary Policy without Commitment. American Economic Review. 2026;116(7):2422-2453. doi:10.1257/aer.20241925
BibTeX
@article{Afrouzi2026,
author = {Afrouzi, Hassan and Halac, Marina and Rogoff, Kenneth and Yared, Pierre},
title = {Monetary Policy without Commitment},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
number = {7},
pages = {2422--2453},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20241925}
}
EUVIMED