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Similarity of Information and Collective Action

Deepal Basak, Joyee Deb, Aditya Kuvalekar

American Economic Review · 01.04.2026 · 116 (4) · 1189-1233

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20241056 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.04.2026. Verfasst von Deepal Basak und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 52 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision. (JEL C71, D71, D72, D81, D82, D83, H41)

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APA

Basak, D., Deb, J., & Kuvalekar, A. (2026). Similarity of Information and Collective Action. American Economic Review, 116(4), 1189-1233. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20241056

Vancouver

Basak D, Deb J, Kuvalekar A. Similarity of Information and Collective Action. American Economic Review. 2026;116(4):1189-1233. doi:10.1257/aer.20241056

BibTeX
@article{Basak2026,
  author = {Basak, Deepal and Deb, Joyee and Kuvalekar, Aditya},
  title = {Similarity of Information and Collective Action},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {116},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1189--1233},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20241056}
}
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