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The Attention-Information Trade-Off

Marta Serra-Garcia

American Economic Review · 01.05.2026 · 116 (5) · 1579-1610

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240850 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Marta Serra-Garcia. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 83 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals’ incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers to the content created. Attention incentives lead to significantly less information being transmitted, but not more factually inaccurate content. These incentives increase information demand and the knowledge of interested receivers. However, among the majority of receivers who do not demand more information, attention incentives lower knowledge and increase biases in beliefs, revealing a channel through which misperceptions can arise: missing information. (JEL C91, D83, D91)

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APA

Serra-Garcia, M. (2026). The Attention-Information Trade-Off. American Economic Review, 116(5), 1579-1610. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20240850

Vancouver

Serra-Garcia M. The Attention-Information Trade-Off. American Economic Review. 2026;116(5):1579-1610. doi:10.1257/aer.20240850

BibTeX
@article{SerraGarcia2026,
  author = {Serra-Garcia, Marta},
  title = {The Attention-Information Trade-Off},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {116},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1579--1610},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20240850}
}
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