Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation
American Economic Review · 01.08.2026 · 116 (8) · 3036-3075
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240617 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von Ingrid Huitfeldt und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 56 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism when agents' preferences over objects change over time. In the context of Norway's system for (re)assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs), we provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current mechanism—patients waiting for each others' GPs, but who cannot trade—and estimate a structural model of GP-switching behavior to evaluate alternatives. Introducing top trading cycles (TTC) would, on average, reduce waiting times and increase patient welfare. However, patients endowed with less desirable GPs would be harmed. Prioritizing these patients can avoid these harms while preserving most of the gains from TTC. (JEL D82, H51, I11, I13, I18)
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APA
Huitfeldt, I., Marone, V., & Waldinger, D. (2026). Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation. American Economic Review, 116(8), 3036-3075. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20240617
Vancouver
Huitfeldt I, Marone V, Waldinger D. Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation. American Economic Review. 2026;116(8):3036-3075. doi:10.1257/aer.20240617
BibTeX
@article{Huitfeldt2026,
author = {Huitfeldt, Ingrid and Marone, Victoria and Waldinger, Daniel},
title = {Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
number = {8},
pages = {3036--3075},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20240617}
}
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