Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers
American Economic Review · 01.08.2026 · 116 (8) · 2962-2995
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231696 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von Aaron Chalfin und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 82 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement. (JEL K42, J33, J45)
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APA
Chalfin, A., & Gonçalves, F. (2026). Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers. American Economic Review, 116(8), 2962-2995. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20231696
Vancouver
Chalfin A, Gonçalves F. Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers. American Economic Review. 2026;116(8):2962-2995. doi:10.1257/aer.20231696
BibTeX
@article{Chalfin2026,
author = {Chalfin, Aaron and Gonçalves, Felipe},
title = {Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
number = {8},
pages = {2962--2995},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20231696}
}
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