Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms
American Economic Review · 01.08.2024 · 114 (8) · 2553-2595
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230478 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.08.2024. Verfasst von Dirk Bergemann und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 99-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue-optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium, sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off platform. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers. (JEL D11, D42, D44, D82, D83, M37)
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APA
Bergemann, D., & Bonatti, A. (2024). Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms. American Economic Review, 114(8), 2553-2595. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20230478
Vancouver
Bergemann D, Bonatti A. Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms. American Economic Review. 2024;114(8):2553-2595. doi:10.1257/aer.20230478
BibTeX
@article{Bergemann2024,
author = {Bergemann, Dirk and Bonatti, Alessandro},
title = {Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2024},
volume = {114},
number = {8},
pages = {2553--2595},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20230478}
}
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