The Price of Power: Costs of Political Corruption in Indian Electricity
American Economic Review · 01.10.2024 · 114 (10) · 3314-3344
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230248 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.10.2024. Verfasst von Meera Mahadevan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 83 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Politicians may target public goods to benefit their constituents, at the expense of others. I study corruption in the context of Indian electricity and estimate the welfare consequences. Using new administrative billing data and close-election regression discontinuities, I show that billed electricity consumption is lower for constituencies of the winning party by almost 40 percent, while actual consumption, measured by nighttime lights, is higher. I document the covert way in which politicians subsidize constituents by manipulating bills. These actions have substantial welfare implications, with an efficiency loss of US$0.9 billion, leading to unreliable electricity supply and significant negative consequences for development. (JEL D72, D73, L94, L98, O13, O17)
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APA
Mahadevan, M. (2024). The Price of Power: Costs of Political Corruption in Indian Electricity. American Economic Review, 114(10), 3314-3344. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20230248
Vancouver
Mahadevan M. The Price of Power: Costs of Political Corruption in Indian Electricity. American Economic Review. 2024;114(10):3314-3344. doi:10.1257/aer.20230248
BibTeX
@article{Mahadevan2024,
author = {Mahadevan, Meera},
title = {The Price of Power: Costs of Political Corruption in Indian Electricity},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2024},
volume = {114},
number = {10},
pages = {3314--3344},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20230248}
}
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