Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing
American Economic Review · 01.07.2024 · 114 (7) · 2073-2110
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220328 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.07.2024. Verfasst von Manuel Amador und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 30-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 74 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs, where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy-wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies, in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs, credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals, credit easing may have adverse consequences. (JEL E32, E44, E58, G01, G21, G28, G33)
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APA
Amador, M., & Bianchi, J. (2024). Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing. American Economic Review, 114(7), 2073-2110. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220328
Vancouver
Amador M, Bianchi J. Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing. American Economic Review. 2024;114(7):2073-2110. doi:10.1257/aer.20220328
BibTeX
@article{Amador2024,
author = {Amador, Manuel and Bianchi, Javier},
title = {Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2024},
volume = {114},
number = {7},
pages = {2073--2110},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20220328}
}
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