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Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing

Manuel Amador, Javier Bianchi

American Economic Review · 01.07.2024 · 114 (7) · 2073-2110

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220328 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.07.2024. Verfasst von Manuel Amador und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 30-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 74 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs, where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy-wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies, in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs, credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals, credit easing may have adverse consequences. (JEL E32, E44, E58, G01, G21, G28, G33)

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APA

Amador, M., & Bianchi, J. (2024). Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing. American Economic Review, 114(7), 2073-2110. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220328

Vancouver

Amador M, Bianchi J. Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing. American Economic Review. 2024;114(7):2073-2110. doi:10.1257/aer.20220328

BibTeX
@article{Amador2024,
  author = {Amador, Manuel and Bianchi, Javier},
  title = {Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {114},
  number = {7},
  pages = {2073--2110},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20220328}
}
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