Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?
American Economic Review · 01.04.2023 · 113 (4) · 1112-1141
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210476 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.04.2023. Verfasst von Anil K Kashyap und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 50-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We propose a tractable model of asset management in which benchmarking arises endogenously, and analyze its welfare consequences. Fund managers' portfolios are not contractible and they incur private costs in running them. Incentive contracts for fund managers create a pecuniary externality through their effect on asset prices. Benchmarking inflates asset prices and creates crowded trades. The crowding reduces the effectiveness of benchmarking in incentive contracts for others, which fund investors fail to account for. A social planner, recognizing the crowding, opts for contracts with less benchmarking and less incentive provision. The planner also delivers lower asset management costs. (JEL D82, D86, G11, G12, G23, G41)
Zitieren
APA
Kashyap, A. K., Kovrijnykh, N., Li, J., & Pavlova, A. (2023). Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?. American Economic Review, 113(4), 1112-1141. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210476
Vancouver
Kashyap AK, Kovrijnykh N, Li J, Pavlova A. Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?. American Economic Review. 2023;113(4):1112-1141. doi:10.1257/aer.20210476
BibTeX
@article{Kashyap2023,
author = {Kashyap, Anil K and Kovrijnykh, Natalia and Li, Jian and Pavlova, Anna},
title = {Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2023},
volume = {113},
number = {4},
pages = {1112--1141},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20210476}
}
EUVIMED