Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
American Economic Review · 01.10.2023 · 113 (10) · 2689-2717
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210096 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.10.2023. Verfasst von David Delacrétaz und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 60-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle. (JEL C78, D82, J15, J18)
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APA
Delacrétaz, D., Kominers, S. D., & Teytelboym, A. (2023). Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement. American Economic Review, 113(10), 2689-2717. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210096
Vancouver
Delacrétaz D, Kominers SD, Teytelboym A. Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement. American Economic Review. 2023;113(10):2689-2717. doi:10.1257/aer.20210096
BibTeX
@article{Delacrtaz2023,
author = {Delacrétaz, David and Kominers, Scott Duke and Teytelboym, Alexander},
title = {Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2023},
volume = {113},
number = {10},
pages = {2689--2717},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20210096}
}
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