Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India’s Direct Benefit Transfer Policy
American Economic Review · 01.12.2024 · 114 (12) · 3812-3846
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161864 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.12.2024. Verfasst von Prabhat Barnwal. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 74 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Targeted price subsidies create a gap between subsidized and unsubsidized prices. The resulting dual pricing can lead to arbitrage opportunities where intermediaries divert subsidized goods to unintended beneficiaries via the black market. I study India’s Direct Benefit Transfer policy for cooking fuel subsidies, which altered the existing subsidy program by transferring subsidies directly to beneficiaries’ bank accounts. The policy decreased subsidized fuel purchases, indicating a reduction in diversion to the black market. Changes in unsubsidized fuel sales and black market prices provide supporting evidence that leakage was reduced. These results suggest that addressing the underlying perverse incentives in welfare delivery can improve efficiency by curbing leakages. (JEL D73, I38, O17, Q41, Q48)
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APA
Barnwal, P. (2024). Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India’s Direct Benefit Transfer Policy. American Economic Review, 114(12), 3812-3846. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161864
Vancouver
Barnwal P. Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India’s Direct Benefit Transfer Policy. American Economic Review. 2024;114(12):3812-3846. doi:10.1257/aer.20161864
BibTeX
@article{Barnwal2024,
author = {Barnwal, Prabhat},
title = {Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India’s Direct Benefit Transfer Policy},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2024},
volume = {114},
number = {12},
pages = {3812--3846},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20161864}
}
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