Corruption Breeds Corruption
Studies in Microeconomics · 2014
DOI: 10.1177/2321022214522730 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Studies in Microeconomics, 2014. Verfasst von Anirban Ghatak und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 23 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study extortion bribe or harassment bribe as a mode of corruption in this article. Corruption is modelled as a network game in the study. We take reputation into account in this model, and assume that reputation has a direct effect on the pay-offs of the agents in this game. We find the necessary conditions to make corruption as an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy against Multiple Mutations (ESSMM) in a game where players have both corruption and honesty as their strategies. ESSMM posits itself as a better tool than Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) to analyze such a situation where a society strives to eradicate traits like corruption completely. We claim that in a market norm (Ariely, 2013) oriented society, corruption breeds corruption and infects the whole society through robust asexual reproduction.
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APA
Ghatak, A., & Iyengar, S. (2014). Corruption Breeds Corruption. Studies in Microeconomics. https://doi.org/10.1177/2321022214522730
Vancouver
Ghatak A, Iyengar S. Corruption Breeds Corruption. Studies in Microeconomics. 2014. doi:10.1177/2321022214522730
BibTeX
@article{Ghatak2014,
author = {Ghatak, Anirban and Iyengar, Sudarshan},
title = {Corruption Breeds Corruption},
journal = {Studies in Microeconomics},
year = {2014},
doi = {10.1177/2321022214522730}
}
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