How does clientelism foster electoral dominance? Evidence from Turkey
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics · 2022-09 · 7 (3) · 559-575
DOI: 10.1177/2057891120920718 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, online erschienen am 22.04.2020. Verfasst von Düzgün Arslantaş und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 25-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Universität zu Köln.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article reveals how the AKP’s use of clientelism contributes to its electoral dominance. It does so by examining the features and actors as well as the structure of the clientelist network. The arguments are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Bağcılar, where in the 2015 legislative elections the AKP achieved more votes than in any other district in Istanbul.
Förderung
- Universität zu Köln
Zitieren
APA
Arslantaş, D., & Arslantaş, Ş. (2022). How does clientelism foster electoral dominance? Evidence from Turkey. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 7(3), 559-575. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891120920718
Vancouver
Arslantaş D, Arslantaş Ş. How does clientelism foster electoral dominance? Evidence from Turkey. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics. 2022;7(3):559-575. doi:10.1177/2057891120920718
BibTeX
@article{Arslanta2022,
author = {Arslantaş, Düzgün and Arslantaş, Şenol},
title = {How does clientelism foster electoral dominance? Evidence from Turkey},
journal = {Asian Journal of Comparative Politics},
year = {2022},
volume = {7},
number = {3},
pages = {559--575},
doi = {10.1177/2057891120920718}
}
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