Moors’ Eliminativism Cross-Examined: Why Emotions Are Not Goal-Directed Cycles
Emotion Review · 2026-04 · 18 (2) · 80-84
DOI: 10.1177/17540739261426001 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Emotion Review, online erschienen am 26.02.2026. Verfasst von Andrea Scarantino. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 9 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Moors’ eliminativist theory of emotions aims to show that understanding emotional behavior as goal-directed behavior when the goals are high value explains all that is worth explaining about behavior without invoking the concept of emotion. I argue that eliminating emotions in favor of goal-directed cycles has major explanatory costs, because emotional behavior differs in important ways from behavior governed by cost-benefit analysis. I compare and contrast Moors’ theory with my own Motivational Theory of Emotions (MTE) with respect to two explanatory challenges in particular—emotion-induced decisional paralysis and recalcitrance. I conclude that we cannot make sense of these affective phenomena in purely goal-directed terms, and that a stimulus-driven process of behavior causation such as the one posited by MTE is required for explanatory purposes.
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APA
Scarantino, A. (2026). Moors’ Eliminativism Cross-Examined: Why Emotions Are Not Goal-Directed Cycles. Emotion Review, 18(2), 80-84. https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739261426001
Vancouver
Scarantino A. Moors’ Eliminativism Cross-Examined: Why Emotions Are Not Goal-Directed Cycles. Emotion Review. 2026;18(2):80-84. doi:10.1177/17540739261426001
BibTeX
@article{Scarantino2026,
author = {Scarantino, Andrea},
title = {Moors’ Eliminativism Cross-Examined: Why Emotions Are Not Goal-Directed Cycles},
journal = {Emotion Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {80--84},
doi = {10.1177/17540739261426001}
}
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