EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Incomparability and Incommensurability in Choice: No Common Currency of Value?

Lukasz Walasek iD, Gordon D A Brown iD

Perspectives on Psychological Science · 2024

DOI: 10.1177/17456916231192828 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2024. Verfasst von Lukasz Walasek und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Psychology, University of Warwick. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Choice Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 136 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Economic and Social Research Council, H2020 European Research Council.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Models of decision-making typically assume the existence of some common currency of value, such as utility, happiness, or inclusive fitness. This common currency is taken to allow comparison of options and to underpin everyday choice. Here we suggest instead that there is no universal value scale, that incommensurable values pervade everyday choice, and hence that most existing models of decision-making in both economics and psychology are fundamentally limited. We propose that choice objects can be compared only with reference to specific but nonuniversal “covering values.” These covering values may reflect decision-makers’ goals, motivations, or current states. A complete model of choice must accommodate the range of possible covering values. We show that abandoning the common-currency assumption in models of judgment and decision-making necessitates rank-based and “simple heuristics” models that contrast radically with conventional utility-based approaches. We note that if there is no universal value scale, then Arrow’s impossibility theorem places severe bounds on the rationality of individual decision-making and hence that there is a deep link between the incommensurability of value, inconsistencies in human decision-making, and rank-based coding of value. More generally, incommensurability raises the question of whether it will ever be possible to develop single-quantity-maximizing models of decision-making.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Choice BehaviorHumansModels, PsychologicalDecision MakingJudgmentHeuristics

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

choicedecision-makingincommensurabilityincomparabilityjudgmentutility

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Psychology, University of Warwick.

ORCID-Profile: Lukasz Walasek, Gordon D A Brown

Förderung

  • Economic and Social Research Council
  • H2020 European Research Council

Zitieren

APA

Walasek, L., & Brown, G. D. A. (2024). Incomparability and Incommensurability in Choice: No Common Currency of Value?. Perspectives on Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916231192828

Vancouver

Walasek L, Brown GDA. Incomparability and Incommensurability in Choice: No Common Currency of Value?. Perspectives on Psychological Science. 2024. doi:10.1177/17456916231192828

BibTeX
@article{Walasek2024,
  author = {Walasek, Lukasz and Brown, Gordon D A},
  title = {Incomparability and Incommensurability in Choice: No Common Currency of Value?},
  journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1177/17456916231192828}
}
Kostenlos starten →