The hidden cost of coordination in tourism destinations
Tourism Economics · 22.05.2026
DOI: 10.1177/13548166261446019 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Tourism Economics, online erschienen am 22.05.2026. Verfasst von Angeliki N Menegaki und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 23 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper revisits the canonical result that coordination among suppliers of complementary tourism services–such as accommodation, transport, and local activities–typically raises profits while increasing output and lowering consumer prices. We introduce a novel mechanism: labor market feedback. When firms share a common labor pool, coordination internalizes a cost externality that can overturn the traditional outcome. Extending the Cournot framework to include an upward-sloping labor supply, we show that under tight labor markets, coordination amplifies firms’ dual market power in product and labor markets. This enables firms to restrict output, raise prices, and depress wages, even as profits rise. Our findings challenge the established “anticommons” logic and carry implications for destination management and competition policy.
Zitieren
APA
Menegaki, A. N., & Serfes, K. (2026). The hidden cost of coordination in tourism destinations. Tourism Economics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13548166261446019
Vancouver
Menegaki AN, Serfes K. The hidden cost of coordination in tourism destinations. Tourism Economics. 2026. doi:10.1177/13548166261446019
BibTeX
@article{Menegaki2026,
author = {Menegaki, Angeliki N and Serfes, Konstantinos},
title = {The hidden cost of coordination in tourism destinations},
journal = {Tourism Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1177/13548166261446019}
}
EUVIMED