Is sidestepping the judiciary seen as democratic? Evidence from Great Britain and Spain
Party Politics · 28.10.2026
DOI: 10.1177/13540688261497233 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Party Politics, online erschienen am 28.10.2026. Verfasst von Noam Titelman und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 39 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: British Academy, Millenium Nucleus for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Executives often bypass the courts without public backlash and, sometimes, with public support. This research note evaluates one strategy employed by politicians for securing public backing when bypassing the courts: a majoritarian framing. We evaluate this strategy through candidate survey experiments in Great Britain ( n = 957) and Spain ( n = 995) that contrast this framing with institutional checks and balances. On average, respondents rate the candidate pushing for court bypassing as less democratic. Nevertheless, a sizeable minority in both countries judges this option as more democratic. These results indicate that heterogeneous understandings of what counts as democratic can sustain public tolerance for executive bypass of the courts.
Förderung
- British Academy
- Millenium Nucleus for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile
Zitieren
APA
Titelman, N., Sajuria, J., & Zanotti, L. (2026). Is sidestepping the judiciary seen as democratic? Evidence from Great Britain and Spain. Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688261497233
Vancouver
Titelman N, Sajuria J, Zanotti L. Is sidestepping the judiciary seen as democratic? Evidence from Great Britain and Spain. Party Politics. 2026. doi:10.1177/13540688261497233
BibTeX
@article{Titelman2026,
author = {Titelman, Noam and Sajuria, Javier and Zanotti, Lisa},
title = {Is sidestepping the judiciary seen as democratic? Evidence from Great Britain and Spain},
journal = {Party Politics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1177/13540688261497233}
}
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