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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference

Maxwell JD Ramstead, Michael D Kirchhoff, Karl J Friston

Adaptive Behavior · 2020-08 · 28 (4) · 225-239

DOI: 10.1177/1059712319862774 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Adaptive Behavior, online erschienen am 21.07.2019. Verfasst von Maxwell JD Ramstead und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 180-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Wellcome Trust, canada first research excellence fund, australian research council.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The aim of this article is to clarify how best to interpret some of the central constructs that underwrite the free-energy principle (FEP) – and its corollary, active inference – in theoretical neuroscience and biology: namely, the role that generative models and variational densities play in this theory. We argue that these constructs have been systematically misrepresented in the literature, because of the conflation between the FEP and active inference, on the one hand, and distinct (albeit closely related) Bayesian formulations, centred on the brain – variously known as predictive processing, predictive coding or the prediction error minimisation framework. More specifically, we examine two contrasting interpretations of these models: a structural representationalist interpretation and an enactive interpretation. We argue that the structural representationalist interpretation of generative and recognition models does not do justice to the role that these constructs play in active inference under the FEP. We propose an enactive interpretation of active inference – what might be called enactive inference. In active inference under the FEP, the generative and recognition models are best cast as realising inference and control – the self-organising, belief-guided selection of action policies – and do not have the properties ascribed by structural representationalists.

Förderung

  • Wellcome Trust
  • canada first research excellence fund
  • australian research council
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

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APA

Ramstead, M. J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Friston, K. J. (2020). A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference. Adaptive Behavior, 28(4), 225-239. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712319862774

Vancouver

Ramstead MJ, Kirchhoff MD, Friston KJ. A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference. Adaptive Behavior. 2020;28(4):225-239. doi:10.1177/1059712319862774

BibTeX
@article{Ramstead2020,
  author = {Ramstead, Maxwell JD and Kirchhoff, Michael D and Friston, Karl J},
  title = {A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference},
  journal = {Adaptive Behavior},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {28},
  number = {4},
  pages = {225--239},
  doi = {10.1177/1059712319862774}
}
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