Truth-commitment and constitutional choice
Rationality and Society · 2026-05 · 38 (2) · 222-248
DOI: 10.1177/10434631261436253 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Rationality and Society, online erschienen am 13.03.2026. Verfasst von Niclas Berggren. Die Arbeit nennt 39 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: John Templeton Foundation, Anders Sandrews Stiftelse.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper develops a Calculus of Consent -inspired model that focuses on how strongly citizens believe there are moral truths in politics. This truth-commitment is treated as an environmental parameter that shifts external-cost and decision-cost schedules while maintaining the contractarian objective of minimizing their sum. Two results follow. First, the optimal threshold tightens when truth-commitment steepens external costs relative to decision costs and loosens in the reverse case; under a plausible configuration, higher truth-commitment implies stricter rules. Second, even at the optimal rule, the minimized sum of external and decision costs weakly increases whenever truth-commitment raises either component at a fixed rule. The analysis is agnostic about the existence of political moral truth. An interpretive section situates these results in Buchanan’s procedural liberalism under moral anti-realism and explains why popular belief in moral truth tends to elevate the costs of collective organization, providing a contractarian rationale for his skepticism. Extensions sketch how consensus and conviction operate as orthogonal channels, how rights can substitute for higher thresholds, how heterogeneous truth-commitments aggregate, and how perception shifts tied to truth-commitment can distort observed rules. The paper brings metaethical beliefs into the positive theory of constitutional choice, providing a tractable formal account of how truth-commitment shapes optimal rules and the costs of collective organization.
Förderung
- John Templeton Foundation
- Anders Sandrews Stiftelse
Zitieren
APA
Berggren, N. (2026). Truth-commitment and constitutional choice. Rationality and Society, 38(2), 222-248. https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631261436253
Vancouver
Berggren N. Truth-commitment and constitutional choice. Rationality and Society. 2026;38(2):222-248. doi:10.1177/10434631261436253
BibTeX
@article{Berggren2026,
author = {Berggren, Niclas},
title = {Truth-commitment and constitutional choice},
journal = {Rationality and Society},
year = {2026},
volume = {38},
number = {2},
pages = {222--248},
doi = {10.1177/10434631261436253}
}
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