Financial Deepening
Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice · 2019
DOI: 10.1177/0976747918814031 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2019. Verfasst von Shankha Chakraborty. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 22 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article proposes a tractable model of the evolution of financial structure. Firms invest out of internal assets and by borrowing from banks and the financial market. In the presence of moral hazard, whereby owner–managers may intentionally reduce profitability of investment to appropriate resources, banks can monitor firms and partially alleviate agency problems. Under the optimal financial contract, banks monitor and outside investors lend to firms only if they borrow from banks too. The model is broadly consistent with financial development facts. Capital accumulation is facilitated by an increasing reliance on both types of external finance. Initially firms rely more heavily on expensive bank finance. With further development, banks eliminate much of the agency problem and firms substitute in favour of cheaper market finance. The short- and long-run effects of financial sector reforms are considered. JEL: E44, G20, O16
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APA
Chakraborty, S. (2019). Financial Deepening. Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1177/0976747918814031
Vancouver
Chakraborty S. Financial Deepening. Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice. 2019. doi:10.1177/0976747918814031
BibTeX
@article{Chakraborty2019,
author = {Chakraborty, Shankha},
title = {Financial Deepening},
journal = {Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.1177/0976747918814031}
}
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