Unilateral Policies, Competitiveness and the ‘Green Paradox’ in a Dynamic North–South Model
Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice · 2018
DOI: 10.1177/0976747918796878 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2018. Verfasst von Partha Sen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The effects of a unilateral cut in emissions (e.g., by Annexure 1 countries in Kyoto) are analysed in a dynamic two-country two-commodity model. If the fossil fuel is priced at marginal cost, then a unilateral cut reduces total emissions (the carbon leakage is less than 100%). But if the fuel is priced above marginal cost, then a ‘green paradox’ appears, that is, the price of the fuel will fall until its use (over time) exhausts the entire stock. Here, a unilateral policy is self-defeating and it is necessary to get binding commitments on fossil fuel use from all the countries. The production and trade implications for the participant and non-participant countries are analysed. JEL: Q4, Q50, Q54, Q56
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APA
Sen, P. (2018). Unilateral Policies, Competitiveness and the ‘Green Paradox’ in a Dynamic North–South Model. Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1177/0976747918796878
Vancouver
Sen P. Unilateral Policies, Competitiveness and the ‘Green Paradox’ in a Dynamic North–South Model. Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice. 2018. doi:10.1177/0976747918796878
BibTeX
@article{Sen2018,
author = {Sen, Partha},
title = {Unilateral Policies, Competitiveness and the ‘Green Paradox’ in a Dynamic North–South Model},
journal = {Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.1177/0976747918796878}
}
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