Optimal Privatisation Policy under Private Leadership in Mixed Oligopolies
Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice · 2018
DOI: 10.1177/0976747918778441 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2018. Verfasst von Ming Hsin Lin und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We discuss optimal privatisation policies in mixed oligopolies in which a public firm is the Stackelberg follower (private leadership). We find that under constant marginal cost, the optimal degree of privatisation is zero. When the marginal cost is increasing, however, the optimal degree is never zero, and full privatisation can be optimal. These results suggest that the optimal privatisation policy depends on the cost conditions. We also find that the optimal degree of privatisation is substantially lower under private leadership than in the simultaneous-move model when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.
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APA
Lin, M. H., & Matsumura, T. (2018). Optimal Privatisation Policy under Private Leadership in Mixed Oligopolies. Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1177/0976747918778441
Vancouver
Lin MH, Matsumura T. Optimal Privatisation Policy under Private Leadership in Mixed Oligopolies. Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice. 2018. doi:10.1177/0976747918778441
BibTeX
@article{Lin2018,
author = {Lin, Ming Hsin and Matsumura, Toshihiro},
title = {Optimal Privatisation Policy under Private Leadership in Mixed Oligopolies},
journal = {Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.1177/0976747918778441}
}
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