Asymmetric Escalation in Occupied Greece: Insurgency, Repression, and the Failure of Italian Counter-Insurgency, 1941–1943
War in History · 27.07.2026
DOI: 10.1177/09683445261473856 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift War in History, online erschienen am 27.07.2026. Verfasst von Massimiliano Fiore und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article examines the Italian occupation of Greece as a process of asymmetric escalation rather than a static regime of control. Drawing on Italian and Greek archival sources, it traces a mutually reinforcing cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency in which partisan adaptation prompted coercive Italian responses. It argues that Italian policy evolved from territorial policing to a radicalized strategy of collective punishment and socio-economic destruction, shaped by a counter-insurgency repertoire rooted in colonial pacification and formal directives. Rather than restoring authority, repression accelerated collapse, enabled a partisan counter-state, and exposed Italy as the weakest link in the Axis occupation system.
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APA
Fiore, M., & Plakoudas, S. (2026). Asymmetric Escalation in Occupied Greece: Insurgency, Repression, and the Failure of Italian Counter-Insurgency, 1941–1943. War in History. https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445261473856
Vancouver
Fiore M, Plakoudas S. Asymmetric Escalation in Occupied Greece: Insurgency, Repression, and the Failure of Italian Counter-Insurgency, 1941–1943. War in History. 2026. doi:10.1177/09683445261473856
BibTeX
@article{Fiore2026,
author = {Fiore, Massimiliano and Plakoudas, Spyridon},
title = {Asymmetric Escalation in Occupied Greece: Insurgency, Repression, and the Failure of Italian Counter-Insurgency, 1941–1943},
journal = {War in History},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1177/09683445261473856}
}
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