The accountability dilemma in mass purges
Journal of Theoretical Politics · 2026-07 · 38 (3) · 197-229
DOI: 10.1177/09516298261426274 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical Politics, online erschienen am 17.03.2026. Verfasst von Xiaoli Guo. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Despite expectations that large-scale anti-corruption campaigns would enhance governance, they often lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and economic decline, as seen in China and Vietnam. This paper examines these purges as a top-down accountability mechanism in authoritarian regimes. Through a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that systemic corruption traps rulers in a persistent trade-off between social productivity and political stability. Whether rulers incentivize informants, distinguish between ideologically congruent and non-congruent agents, prioritize profit or survival, or base purges on corruption or performance, the core dilemma remains—and often becomes more intricate. Our findings challenge the effectiveness of mass purges as a sustainable governance strategy.
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APA
Guo, X. (2026). The accountability dilemma in mass purges. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 38(3), 197-229. https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298261426274
Vancouver
Guo X. The accountability dilemma in mass purges. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2026;38(3):197-229. doi:10.1177/09516298261426274
BibTeX
@article{Guo2026,
author = {Guo, Xiaoli},
title = {The accountability dilemma in mass purges},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
year = {2026},
volume = {38},
number = {3},
pages = {197--229},
doi = {10.1177/09516298261426274}
}
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