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The accountability dilemma in mass purges

Xiaoli Guo

Journal of Theoretical Politics · 2026-07 · 38 (3) · 197-229

DOI: 10.1177/09516298261426274 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical Politics, online erschienen am 17.03.2026. Verfasst von Xiaoli Guo. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Despite expectations that large-scale anti-corruption campaigns would enhance governance, they often lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and economic decline, as seen in China and Vietnam. This paper examines these purges as a top-down accountability mechanism in authoritarian regimes. Through a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that systemic corruption traps rulers in a persistent trade-off between social productivity and political stability. Whether rulers incentivize informants, distinguish between ideologically congruent and non-congruent agents, prioritize profit or survival, or base purges on corruption or performance, the core dilemma remains—and often becomes more intricate. Our findings challenge the effectiveness of mass purges as a sustainable governance strategy.

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APA

Guo, X. (2026). The accountability dilemma in mass purges. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 38(3), 197-229. https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298261426274

Vancouver

Guo X. The accountability dilemma in mass purges. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2026;38(3):197-229. doi:10.1177/09516298261426274

BibTeX
@article{Guo2026,
  author = {Guo, Xiaoli},
  title = {The accountability dilemma in mass purges},
  journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {38},
  number = {3},
  pages = {197--229},
  doi = {10.1177/09516298261426274}
}
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