Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting
Journal of Theoretical Politics · 2019-10 · 31 (4) · 626-641
DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875516 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical Politics, online erschienen am 18.09.2019. Verfasst von Yasushi Asako. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 25 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72
Förderung
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Zitieren
APA
Asako, Y. (2019). Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 31(4), 626-641. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875516
Vancouver
Asako Y. Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2019;31(4):626-641. doi:10.1177/0951629819875516
BibTeX
@article{Asako2019,
author = {Asako, Yasushi},
title = {Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
year = {2019},
volume = {31},
number = {4},
pages = {626--641},
doi = {10.1177/0951629819875516}
}
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