Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements
Journal of Theoretical Politics · 2014-07 · 26 (3) · 468-495
DOI: 10.1177/0951629813505723 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical Politics, online erschienen am 07.11.2013. Verfasst von Leslie Johns. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 37-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I examine the impact of depth and rigidity in international trade agreements. Increasing the depth of required cooperation lowers the likelihood of full compliance and the stability of a trade regime. In contrast, increasing the rigidity of an agreement raises the likelihood of full compliance and lowers stability. Both depth and rigidity can lower tariffs if a state does not defect from its treaty obligations. I argue that if we control for the benefits of trade liberalization, then observable treaties will have a negative relationship between depth and rigidity. Deep agreements will be flexible, while shallow agreements will be rigid.
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APA
Johns, L. (2014). Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26(3), 468-495. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629813505723
Vancouver
Johns L. Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2014;26(3):468-495. doi:10.1177/0951629813505723
BibTeX
@article{Johns2014,
author = {Johns, Leslie},
title = {Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
year = {2014},
volume = {26},
number = {3},
pages = {468--495},
doi = {10.1177/0951629813505723}
}
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