From Volatility to Validity: An Indexed Approach to Long-Term Incentive Plan Target-Setting
Compensation & Benefits Review · 17.06.2026
DOI: 10.1177/08863687261459707 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Compensation & Benefits Review, online erschienen am 17.06.2026. Verfasst von Hermann Josef Stern. Die Arbeit nennt 10 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Traditional long-term executive incentive plans (LTIPs) too often fail in volatile markets because they rely on fixed, absolute targets that are susceptible to overconfidence bias and unpredictable external economic shifts. These impacts result in erratic payouts, alternating between windfall gains and demotivating zeros, that fail to align executive incentives with genuine performance. This article employs Trane Technologies as an illustrative case, drawing on publicly disclosed financial data from 2015 through 2024, to demonstrate a more resilient alternative: the Indexed LTIP. By adding operating metrics such as revenue growth and EBITDA against industry peers and utilizing a percentile ranking system, the approach offers boards and compensation committees a stress-tested methodology to reduce payout volatility and improve long-term alignment with shareholder interests.
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APA
Stern, H. J. (2026). From Volatility to Validity: An Indexed Approach to Long-Term Incentive Plan Target-Setting. Compensation & Benefits Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/08863687261459707
Vancouver
Stern HJ. From Volatility to Validity: An Indexed Approach to Long-Term Incentive Plan Target-Setting. Compensation & Benefits Review. 2026. doi:10.1177/08863687261459707
BibTeX
@article{Stern2026,
author = {Stern, Hermann Josef},
title = {From Volatility to Validity: An Indexed Approach to Long-Term Incentive Plan Target-Setting},
journal = {Compensation & Benefits Review},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1177/08863687261459707}
}
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