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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

A Model-Based Analysis of the AggregateEU Mechanism: Implications of Overbidding and Non-Commitment

Dávid Csercsik, Borbála Takácsné Tóth, Péter Kotek, László Á. Kóczy, Anne Neumann

The Energy Journal · 2026-09 · 47 (5) · 195-224

DOI: 10.1177/01956574261460196 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Energy Journal, online erschienen am 27.07.2026. Verfasst von Dávid Csercsik und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

AggregateEU is a new centralised mechanism that provides a no-commitment platform to trade natural gas in the European Union. Throughout the consultation process, AggregateEU has been mocked as ‘Tinder of the European gas markets’ as it helps consumers and suppliers find partners, but leaves it up to the matched partners to decide whether to contract for potential trade. The non-commitment nature leads to substantial overbidding and many non-realised matches. We propose a quantitative modelling framework to study the effect of overbidding in the AggergateEU demand aggregation or joint purchasing mechanism. We conclude that the mechanism is prone to overbidding and that overbidding has ambiguous effects on trade. Depending on the parameters, overbidding may facilitate trade, but may also result in highly inefficient outcomes when overbidding is combined with miscoordination over the delivery points. Suggested remedies include allowing for convex bids, restrictions on overbidding or giving up part of the non-binding character of the market. Our results suggest that a potential future mechanism allowing the coordination of multiple delivery points could enhance the efficiency of gas markets. JEL Classification : C72, Noncooperative Games; C63, Computational Techniques; Simulation Modelling; D40, Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General; Q40, Energy: General

Förderung

  • Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal
  • Magyar Tudományos Akadémia

Zitieren

APA

Csercsik, D., Tóth, B. T., Kotek, P., Kóczy, L. Á., & Neumann, A. (2026). A Model-Based Analysis of the AggregateEU Mechanism: Implications of Overbidding and Non-Commitment. The Energy Journal, 47(5), 195-224. https://doi.org/10.1177/01956574261460196

Vancouver

Csercsik D, Tóth BT, Kotek P, Kóczy LÁ, Neumann A. A Model-Based Analysis of the AggregateEU Mechanism: Implications of Overbidding and Non-Commitment. The Energy Journal. 2026;47(5):195-224. doi:10.1177/01956574261460196

BibTeX
@article{Csercsik2026,
  author = {Csercsik, Dávid and Tóth, Borbála Takácsné and Kotek, Péter and Kóczy, László Á. and Neumann, Anne},
  title = {A Model-Based Analysis of the AggregateEU Mechanism: Implications of Overbidding and Non-Commitment},
  journal = {The Energy Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {47},
  number = {5},
  pages = {195--224},
  doi = {10.1177/01956574261460196}
}
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