Managerial Overconfidence and Dividend Stickiness
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance · 2025-01 · 40 (1) · 165-192
DOI: 10.1177/0148558x221150102 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, online erschienen am 15.02.2023. Verfasst von Jui-Chia Lin und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this study, we examine whether overconfident CEOs strive to smooth dividends. Our findings show overconfident CEOs increase dividends more as earnings increase and decrease dividends less as earnings decline, resulting in downward dividend stickiness. This asymmetric dividend payout is consistent with the selective self-attribution bias. Furthermore, the effect of managerial overconfidence on dividend stickiness is more pronounced for firms without catering incentives. In addition, overconfident CEOs do not manage share repurchases as they do for dividends. Therefore, we do not find a positive effect of managerial overconfidence on total payout stickiness.
Förderung
- Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan
Zitieren
APA
Lin, J., & Yu, M. (2025). Managerial Overconfidence and Dividend Stickiness. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 40(1), 165-192. https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558x221150102
Vancouver
Lin J, Yu M. Managerial Overconfidence and Dividend Stickiness. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance. 2025;40(1):165-192. doi:10.1177/0148558x221150102
BibTeX
@article{Lin2025,
author = {Lin, Jui-Chia and Yu, Min-Teh},
title = {Managerial Overconfidence and Dividend Stickiness},
journal = {Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
pages = {165--192},
doi = {10.1177/0148558x221150102}
}
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