Idealized Models, Counterfactual Reasoning, and Inductive Risk in Social Science Contexts: The Case of Minimal Models for Inequity
Philosophy of the Social Sciences · 16.11.2026
DOI: 10.1177/00483931261505202 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy of the Social Sciences, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Patricia Marino. Die Arbeit nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This project explores the roles that non-epistemic values play in the use of highly idealized models in social science contexts. Focusing on the use of bargaining models for predictions about interventions, I argue that epistemological challenges for such inferences highlight the need for inductive risk assessments: we must normatively evaluate the consequences of over-confidence and under-confidence in the relevant conclusions. However, I also show that evaluating these consequences is complex, so that inferences from these models to predictive inferences may be difficult to support. I then consider broader implications for recent research on the epistemic risks of using models.
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APA
Marino, P. (2026). Idealized Models, Counterfactual Reasoning, and Inductive Risk in Social Science Contexts: The Case of Minimal Models for Inequity. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261505202
Vancouver
Marino P. Idealized Models, Counterfactual Reasoning, and Inductive Risk in Social Science Contexts: The Case of Minimal Models for Inequity. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 2026. doi:10.1177/00483931261505202
BibTeX
@article{Marino2026,
author = {Marino, Patricia},
title = {Idealized Models, Counterfactual Reasoning, and Inductive Risk in Social Science Contexts: The Case of Minimal Models for Inequity},
journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1177/00483931261505202}
}
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