Two‐Level Games and the Policy Process: Assessing Domestic–Foreign Policy Linkage Theory
World Affairs · 2019-06 · 182 (2) · 165-186
DOI: 10.1177/0043820019839074 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift World Affairs, online erschienen am 11.04.2019. Verfasst von Harry Noone. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 39 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
International relations scholars have struggled to adequately link domestic and international levels in theoretical models and causal analyses of foreign policy, despite widespread acknowledgment of the need to do so. This study elaborates on this challenge by assessing the utility of several policy process frameworks that have so far been underutilized in foreign policy analysis. The assumptions of one particularly fruitful method, the Two‐Level Game, will be compared with those of three policy process frameworks: the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the Multiple Streams Framework, and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. When analyzing three specific concepts (the question of rationality, the dynamics of agenda setting, and the strategic action of relevant actors), it is apparent that the assumptions of the policy process frameworks largely clash with those of the Two‐Level Game, raising the potential for their augmentation of the field of foreign policy analysis despite their relative underuse.
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APA
Noone, H. (2019). Two‐Level Games and the Policy Process: Assessing Domestic–Foreign Policy Linkage Theory. World Affairs, 182(2), 165-186. https://doi.org/10.1177/0043820019839074
Vancouver
Noone H. Two‐Level Games and the Policy Process: Assessing Domestic–Foreign Policy Linkage Theory. World Affairs. 2019;182(2):165-186. doi:10.1177/0043820019839074
BibTeX
@article{Noone2019,
author = {Noone, Harry},
title = {Two‐Level Games and the Policy Process: Assessing Domestic–Foreign Policy Linkage Theory},
journal = {World Affairs},
year = {2019},
volume = {182},
number = {2},
pages = {165--186},
doi = {10.1177/0043820019839074}
}
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