Constrainers vs Enablers? Fiscal Deficits and the Political Survival of Finance Ministers Across Regime Types
Political Studies · 2026-11 · 74 (4) · 1451-1473
DOI: 10.1177/00323217251378842 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Political Studies, online erschienen am 13.10.2025. Verfasst von Jonas Willibald Schmid und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 83 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: H2020 European Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We investigate how fiscal deficits affect the political survival of finance ministers in democracies and autocracies. While finance ministers occupy formally similar roles across regimes, we argue they serve fundamentally different political functions. Drawing on regime-specific incentives and the distinct constraints on public borrowing, we hypothesize that fiscal deficits increase the likelihood of ministerial removal in democracies but not in autocracies. Using global data on finance ministers from 1981 to 2021, we find robust support for our argument. Higher deficits predict an increased risk of ministerial exit, but only in democracies. This speaks to broader debates on economic policy-making, accountability, and elite politics. More broadly, we show that similar institutions operate under diverging logics depending on regime type. This highlights the need for comparative research to take seriously the context-dependent meaning of institutional performance—and to develop theories that reflect variation in how policymakers are constrained and evaluated.
Förderung
- H2020 European Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Schmid, J. W., & Aaskoven, L. (2026). Constrainers vs Enablers? Fiscal Deficits and the Political Survival of Finance Ministers Across Regime Types. Political Studies, 74(4), 1451-1473. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217251378842
Vancouver
Schmid JW, Aaskoven L. Constrainers vs Enablers? Fiscal Deficits and the Political Survival of Finance Ministers Across Regime Types. Political Studies. 2026;74(4):1451-1473. doi:10.1177/00323217251378842
BibTeX
@article{Schmid2026,
author = {Schmid, Jonas Willibald and Aaskoven, Lasse},
title = {Constrainers vs Enablers? Fiscal Deficits and the Political Survival of Finance Ministers Across Regime Types},
journal = {Political Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {74},
number = {4},
pages = {1451--1473},
doi = {10.1177/00323217251378842}
}
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