Power monopoly and rural land expropriation compensation conflict: Construction of an evolutionary game model and empirical evidence from China
Journal of Asian and African Studies · 04.11.2026
DOI: 10.1177/00219096261497282 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Asian and African Studies, online erschienen am 04.11.2026. Verfasst von Wenbo Zheng und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, humanities and social sciences youth foundation, ministry of education, Basic Research Project of Liaoning Provincial Department of Education in 2024.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Land expropriation systems are policy tools to address market failures, but local governments’ monopoly power triggers compensation conflicts. Breaking from the production–distribution dichotomy, this study constructs an evolutionary game model between governments and farmers, using two Chinese datasets. The findings of the study are as follows: (1) under monopoly power, compensation is more associated to fiscal revenue than agricultural land value or geographic location, with no significant interaction between the latter two, and (2) farmers resist only if governments lose sanction power and conflict costs are low. Compensation is not significantly related to farmers’ conflict capabilities. Reforms should strengthen farmers’ land rights, reduce government monopoly, and enhance oversight.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- humanities and social sciences youth foundation, ministry of education
- Basic Research Project of Liaoning Provincial Department of Education in 2024
Zitieren
APA
Zheng, W., Zhang, Q., & Feng, L. (2026). Power monopoly and rural land expropriation compensation conflict: Construction of an evolutionary game model and empirical evidence from China. Journal of Asian and African Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096261497282
Vancouver
Zheng W, Zhang Q, Feng L. Power monopoly and rural land expropriation compensation conflict: Construction of an evolutionary game model and empirical evidence from China. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 2026. doi:10.1177/00219096261497282
BibTeX
@article{Zheng2026,
author = {Zheng, Wenbo and Zhang, Qingyong and Feng, Lei},
title = {Power monopoly and rural land expropriation compensation conflict: Construction of an evolutionary game model and empirical evidence from China},
journal = {Journal of Asian and African Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1177/00219096261497282}
}
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