Frege, Plücker, and the Function–Argument Distinction
Grazer Philosophische Studien · 11.06.2026 · 102 (3-4) · 305-331
DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000249 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Grazer Philosophische Studien, erschienen am 11.06.2026. Verfasst von Tabea Rohr. Die Arbeit nennt 100 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this article, I support the thesis proposed by Tappenden and Wilson that Frege’s function-argument distinction was inspired by the work of the geometer Julius Plücker. However, I also highlight the limits of Plücker’s influence on Frege. I argue, therefore, that the distinction between concept and object – which is crucial for distinguishing between functions of different orders – cannot be traced back to Plücker. Likewise, the clear distinction between a function and its value range is a contribution made by Frege himself. Finally, I take a closer look at Frege’s distinction between arithmetic and geometry, arguing that the concept-argument distinction arises much more naturally in the domain of arithmetic than in that of geometry.
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APA
Rohr, T. (2026). Frege, Plücker, and the Function–Argument Distinction. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 102(3-4), 305-331. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000249
Vancouver
Rohr T. Frege, Plücker, and the Function–Argument Distinction. Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2026;102(3-4):305-331. doi:10.1163/18756735-00000249
BibTeX
@article{Rohr2026,
author = {Rohr, Tabea},
title = {Frege, Plücker, and the Function–Argument Distinction},
journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
year = {2026},
volume = {102},
number = {3-4},
pages = {305--331},
doi = {10.1163/18756735-00000249}
}
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