Collective Harm and Instrumental Reasons
Journal of Moral Philosophy · 16.10.2026 · 1-39
DOI: 10.1163/17455243-bja10233 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Moral Philosophy, erschienen am 16.10.2026. Verfasst von Taylor Koles. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 39 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Collective harm cases are cases in which the actions of a number of people result in a morally significant outcome, but no individual’s actions seem to make a difference to the occurrence of that outcome. This paper argues against the “Instrumentality Thesis,” advanced by Nefsky, on which any successful approach to collective harm cases must be instrumental in the sense that the reasons which it gives against participating in collective harm must involve that action’s influence on the outcome. First, I argue that Nefsky’s own account of collective harm, based on the notion of a “non-superfluous cause,” does not succeed as an instrumental approach. Second, I argue that Nefsky’s objections to non-instrumental views fail, and that we have good reason to think that a successful account of collective harm problems will be non-instrumental in character.
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APA
Koles, T. (2026). Collective Harm and Instrumental Reasons. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 1-39. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-bja10233
Vancouver
Koles T. Collective Harm and Instrumental Reasons. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2026:1-39. doi:10.1163/17455243-bja10233
BibTeX
@article{Koles2026,
author = {Koles, Taylor},
title = {Collective Harm and Instrumental Reasons},
journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--39},
doi = {10.1163/17455243-bja10233}
}
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