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Devotion and Dialectical Invulnerability

Cheshire Calhoun

Journal of Moral Philosophy · 11.11.2026 · 1-15

DOI: 10.1163/17455243-bja10198 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Moral Philosophy, erschienen am 11.11.2026. Verfasst von Cheshire Calhoun.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

I focus on Katsafanas’s conceptions of devotion and dialectical invulnerability, including the kinds of reasons to which devotions are invulnerable. I suggest friendly amendments to the notions of devotion and dialectical invulnerability that narrow the range of what counts as a devotion and as genuine dialectical invulnerability. I also suggest that maintaining personal commitments and devotions involves, at most, dialectical invulnerability to considerations justifying the impersonal value of what we are committed or devoted to. Emphasis is placed on the way commitments and devotions constitutively involve the agent taking a valuing attitude to the object of their commitment and devotion; on distinguishing between not regarding any disfavoring reasons as sufficient to undermine a devotion and regarding justifying reasons as entirely irrelevant; and on the importance of having at least some reasons, even if not objective, impersonal ones, that support one’s valuing attitude in the case of personal devotions.

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APA

Calhoun, C. (2026). Devotion and Dialectical Invulnerability. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-bja10198

Vancouver

Calhoun C. Devotion and Dialectical Invulnerability. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2026:1-15. doi:10.1163/17455243-bja10198

BibTeX
@article{Calhoun2026,
  author = {Calhoun, Cheshire},
  title = {Devotion and Dialectical Invulnerability},
  journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--15},
  doi = {10.1163/17455243-bja10198}
}
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