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The Feminist Case Against Relational Autonomy

Serene J. Khader

Journal of Moral Philosophy · 14.10.2020 · 17 (5) · 499-526

DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20203085 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Moral Philosophy, erschienen am 14.10.2020. Verfasst von Serene J. Khader. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 42-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Feminist socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy make the presence of idealized social conditions necessary for autonomy. I argue that such conceptions cannot, when applied under nonideal conditions, play two key feminist theoretical roles for autonomy: the roles of anti-oppressive character ideal and paternalism-limiting concept. Instead, they prescribe action that reinforces oppression. Treated as character ideals, socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy ask agents living under nonideal ones to engage in self-harm or self-subordination. Moreover, conceptions of autonomy that make idealized social conditions a requirement of autonomy yield the conclusion that oppressed agents are appropriate objects of paternalism.

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APA

Khader, S. J. (2020). The Feminist Case Against Relational Autonomy. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 17(5), 499-526. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20203085

Vancouver

Khader SJ. The Feminist Case Against Relational Autonomy. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2020;17(5):499-526. doi:10.1163/17455243-20203085

BibTeX
@article{Khader2020,
  author = {Khader, Serene J.},
  title = {The Feminist Case Against Relational Autonomy},
  journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {17},
  number = {5},
  pages = {499--526},
  doi = {10.1163/17455243-20203085}
}
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