Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness
Journal of Moral Philosophy · 2012 · 9 (3) · 353-375
DOI: 10.1163/174552412x625727 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2012. Verfasst von Micah Lott. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 28-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
An influential strand of neo-Aristotelianism, represented by writers such as Philippa Foot, holds that moral virtue is a form of natural goodness in human beings, analogous to deep roots in oak trees or keen vision in hawks. Critics, however, have argued that such a view cannot get off the ground, because the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity is untenable in light of a Darwinian account of living things. This criticism has been developed most fully by William Fitzpatrick in his book Teleology and the Norms of Nature . In this paper, I defend the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity, focusing on Fitzpatrick’s arguments. I argue that a natural goodness view is not impugned by an evolutionary account. Nor can neo-Aristotelian life form judgments be replaced by an evolutionary view of living things.
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APA
Lott, M. (2012). Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9(3), 353-375. https://doi.org/10.1163/174552412x625727
Vancouver
Lott M. Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2012;9(3):353-375. doi:10.1163/174552412x625727
BibTeX
@article{Lott2012,
author = {Lott, Micah},
title = {Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness},
journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
year = {2012},
volume = {9},
number = {3},
pages = {353--375},
doi = {10.1163/174552412x625727}
}
EUVIMED