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Prostitution and Abolitionism: Is it Empirically or Axiologicaly Arguable?

Mariona Llobet Anglí

European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice · 18.06.2026 · 1-20

DOI: 10.1163/15718174-bja10101 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, erschienen am 18.06.2026. Verfasst von Mariona Llobet Anglí.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The question of women’s consent in relationships defined by a framework of structural inequality is a topical issue. Can such consent be true and genuine or is it necessarily distorted? This is particularly relevant with regard to adult prostitution. Abolitionist currents, very much in vogue today, especially in Europe, either deny the existence of consent to sex work, or the impossibility of legal recognition for being incompatible with women’s dignity. From such point of view, criminal law should help end prostitution by punishing the clients. This paper questions these assumptions and their conclusions, highlighting the important methodological biases and conceptual inconsistencies of abolitionism (both in empirical and evaluative terms), with consequences incompatible with liberal criminal law.

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APA

Anglí, M. L. (2026). Prostitution and Abolitionism: Is it Empirically or Axiologicaly Arguable?. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718174-bja10101

Vancouver

Anglí ML. Prostitution and Abolitionism: Is it Empirically or Axiologicaly Arguable?. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. 2026:1-20. doi:10.1163/15718174-bja10101

BibTeX
@article{Angl2026,
  author = {Anglí, Mariona Llobet},
  title = {Prostitution and Abolitionism: Is it Empirically or Axiologicaly Arguable?},
  journal = {European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--20},
  doi = {10.1163/15718174-bja10101}
}
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